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(  Ever since I960, the year of African independence, the United States and
the Soviet Union have been involved in growing competition for influence on 
the continent of africa Although the level of involvement of the two super­
powers in Africa has fluctuated during the course of the past two decades, 
since at least the middle of the 1970s the two countries have expanded signi­
ficantly their respective roles in the affiars of the continent For the Soviet 
Union the opportunities presented by the collapse of the Portuguese colonial 
empire and the overthrow of the monarchy in Ethiopia and the ensuing militari­
zation of Soviel policy in Africa represented a watershed in Soviet policy 
By the beginning of the present decade the USSR was involved in an ever-growing 
manner in events throughout the continent— from direct militaryinvclvcment in 
Ethiopia and Angola to expanded political, military and economic support for a 
host of countries In recent years, the United States has resnonded by increas-
(
" ing its involvement in the affairs of a continent which it had largely viewed 
in the past as the preserve of its European allies Military support for re­
gimes as diverse as those of King Hassan of Morocco, President Mobutu of Zaire, 
and President Siad Barre of Somalia, plus expanded diplomatic and economic ef­
forts in the southern portion of the continent have been motivated, in large 
part, by a concern for the growing role of the Soviets and their Cuban and East 
German allies in determining the future course that the countries of Africa will 
take To date neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has managed to 
achieve long-term successes measured in terms of stable influence over a num­
ber of years in a particular country or region For the Soviets the overthrow 
of radical friends in Ghana and Mali in 1965 and 1968 and the break in relations 
with former recipients of Soviet largesse in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia represented 
serious setbacks to a policy aimed at expanding the Soviet role on the continent
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On the other hand, U S support for Emperor Haile Selassie did not prevent the 
radlcalization of the Ethiopian political system, and the growth of a Soviet 
military presence (in conjunction with their allies) is viewed in Washington aa 
an escalating threat to the long-term strategic interests of the West
As Walter Clemens has argued, Soviet and American policies in Africa have 
been based primarily on mutual efforts to gain an advantage in a worldwide 
competition between the two superpowers and on the assumption +hat a gain 
for one necessarily meant a loss for the other 1 In spite of the evidence 
amassed during the postwar period that policies in the Third World based pri­
marily on factors relevant to the global superpower conflict are not likely to 
succeed, the leaderships in both Moscow and Washington continue to take such 
a zero-sum approach to developments in Africa In fact, after something of 
a hiatus in superpower competition in Africa from the mid-1960s to the mid- 
1970s, such competition has expanded almost exponentially during the past six 
or seven years The costs of the broadening Soviet-American conflict in Africa 
— and in the Third World more broadly— are great For the two superpowers they 
include the large sums spent on arming and training the military of client 
or allied states For the countries of Africa they involve an increasing focus 
on military—security problems to the possible exclusion of social-economic is­
sues, the likely escalation of destructiveness of local or regional conflicts, 
and the possible loss of autonomy in relations with the superpower patron 
Moreover, superpower Involvement in the affairs of Africa brings with it the 
possibility of confrontation between the two major nuclear powers that could 
have disastrous results for all of mankind
L
r -3-
1 The Place of Africa In the Sovlet-Amerlcan Global Competition
To a substantial degree Africa has been peripheral to the major aspects 
of Soviet-American conflict during most of the three and a half decades since 
the end of World War II This conflict has focused far more on Europe, the 
Middle East and East Asia during the past thirty years, in particular in the 
1950s as the Soviet Union and the United States sought to consolidate the posi­
tions that they had inherited in the wake of the destruction of their major 
international competitors during the war The Soviet effort to expand and con­
solidate power in the regions adjacent to Soviet territory and the U S attempt 
to contain what was viewed as a major threat by the Soviets to the security of 
the free world was limited in large part by the inability of the USSR to pro­
ject power into areas not contiguous to the Soviet Union In Africa, the con­
tinuing presence of the European colonial powers also acted as an important de­
terrent to Soviet involvement, as did the Soviet refusal under Stalin to view
bourgeois nationalists as anything more than refined agents of Western im- 
2periallsm Not until African states began to achieve independence in the late 
1950s and, especially, the early 1960s were the Soviets afforded opportunities 
to deal directly with the peoples of Africa The major thrust of this policy 
focused on establishing contacts with and supporting anti-Western elements within 
Africa— Sekou Tour! after his split with French President de Gaulle, Patrice 
Lumumba after the post-independence Belgian intervention in the Congo (Leopold­
ville), and Kwame Nkrumah after his turn to the left in the early 1960s— and 
was motivated, in my view, primarily by the goal of competing with the West for 
influence in an area of potential importance for the exercise of international 
power
For the most part, Soviet policy in Africa during the 1960s proved to be 
a failure Soviet efforts in such countries as Ghana, Guinea and Mali were
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tnwar ted by thp overthrow of pro-Soviet leaders (Nkrumah In Ghana in I966 and 
Keita In Mali in 1968) and by the lessening importance of Sekou Touré in the 
evolution of African politics Only in the Muslim portions of the continent 
had Soviet investments of resources and support resulted in what appeared to 
be, at the beginning of the 1970s, the expansion of political, economic and 
security ties Egypt was in the process of becoming what many Western commenta­
tors viewed as a client or satellite of the Soviet Union Prior to the abortive 
coup attempt in which communists were implicated, President Nimiery of Sudan 
had moved in a strongly anti-Western direction, and the new military government 
of Siad Barre in Somalia had turned increasingly toward the U S S B and was on 
the verge of declaring Somalia a Marxist-Leninist state Elsewhere, Soviet re­
lations with the Algerian government of President Boumedienne had developed 
favorably after the initial shock experienced by the Soviets when Lenin Peace 
Prize winner President Ben Bella was overthrown by Boumedienne in I965* Yet, as 
is evident from the perspective of 1982, the apparent strong Soviet petition in 
Muslim Africa was built on a fragile foundation Within a relatively short 
period of time growing differences between the Soviets and the leaders of Egypt, 
Sudan and Somalia expanded to the point that relations were virtually severed 
and, by the end of the 1970s, these three countries were among the most vocal 
critics of Soviet policy in Africa However as the Soviets lost their posi- 
tions in these countries, thq^"overall African policy took on a much more 
military orj t ntation and resulted in a much broader and more extensive involve­
ment in the Affairs of the continent*— involvement oriented largely toward the 
enhancement of the Soviet position in the global conflict with the United States 
Throughout the 1960s U S policy in Africa remained largely an adjunct of 
the policies of its European allies Although the United States had encouraged 
the process of decolonizatiori during the years Immediately following the Second
World War, the ldeologlcal-politlcal-milltary confrontation with the USSR re­
sulted in a growing concern in the U S about the possibilities for communist 
gains throughout the Third World By the middle of the 1950s U S policy in 
the developing countries, including in Africa, was oriented moafe toward the is­
sue of containing the expansion of Soviet power and Influence than it was to­
ward active support for national liberation The United States was generally 
willing to leave the issue of political developments in Africa to Great Btitain, 
France and the other European colonial powers, although it was willing in crisis 
situations, such as the Congo crises of I96I-65, to become directly involved 
Such involvement, however, tended to be motivated largely by the concern that 
political chaos might providethe opportunity for Soviet advances on the conti­
nent
The U S did develop or expand political, economic and military relations 
with a number of African states during the I96OS— in particular with Ethiopia 
in the Horn, Morocco and Libya in the north, and a number of other Western- 
oriented governments With few exceptions, however, the United States did not 
develop an active approach to Africa during the first decade after the movement 
toward independence on the continent Its policies consisted primarily of sup­
port for the initiatives of its allies and of occasional reactions to what were 
viewed as threats to Western interests eminating from the Soviet Union
At the beginning of the 1970s, therefore, direct superpower involvement 
in Africa was limited largely to the northern portion of the continent, where 
the focus of both Soviet ani American interests was more on the Middle East 
than it was on Africa proper Throughout the decade the situation was to change 
substantially as the alliances of local states with the superpowers shifted—  
Egypt, Sudan and Somalia from the USSR to the U S and Libya and Ethiopia from 
the U S  to the Soviet Union, radical regimes came to power in the former Portu-
guese colonial territories, and Cuba and the East European states began to play 
an important role, in conjunction with the Soviets, in the affairs of Africa
2 The Evolution of a Forward Soviet Strategy in Africa
Before turning to an examination of the place of Africa within the over­
all po]icy of the Soviet Union it is important to understand the primary ob­
jectives of the Soviet leaders in the areas of foreign policy and international 
pecurity During his address to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union in 1971 Leonid Brezhnev outlined the basic priorities of So­
viet foreign policy These goals were Included almost verbatim in the new So­
viet constitution of 1977 The USSR s foreign policy is aimed at ensuring 
favorable international conditions for building communism in the USSR, protect­
ing the Soviet Union s state interests, strengthening the positions of world 
socialism, supporting the peoples' struggle for natloral liberation and social 
progress, preventing wars of agression, achieving general and complete disarma­
ment and consistently Implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of 
states with different social systems ^ Soviet foreign policy, in this formulation 
operates at four distinct, but interrelated, levels Of primary importance is 
the protection of the security of the Soviet state and the strengthening of the 
Soviet political and economic system— ensuring favorable international conditions 
for the construction of communism in the USSR and protecting Soviet state in­
terests Examples of this aspect of Soviet policyduring the past decade have 
been both the continuing buildup of Soviet military capabilities and the creation 
of political and economic ties with the outside world that were seen as useful 
for the achievement of such goals as domestic economic growth
The second level of Soviet foreign policy objectives concerns the protection 
and strengthenin of the Soviet position in those countries in which the USSR has
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(  has already established a dominant position The irreversibility of communist
development as enunciated in the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 (and of Afghanistan in 1979) are among the most obvious 
concrete indications of this policy objective The maintenance of the dominant 
Soviet position in Eastern Europe has become almost coterminous Kith the defense 
of the Soviet system itself, as recent Soviet commentary concerning the danger 
of revisionist and anti socialist activities in Poland has demonstrated
The third level of Soviet policy is the competition with the West for in­
fluence in the Third World Support for national liberation movements aims at 
the creation of close ties with Third World leaders and the reduction of resi­
dual Western influence throughout the developing countries Emphasis on social 
progress implies the attempt to use the newly-established relations for the pur­
pose of promoting the establishment of the preconditions for Soviet-style socio- 
 ^ political systems that will eventually enter the world socialist system The 
final element of Soviet foreign policy objectives is the prevention of general 
war and the maintenance of peaceful coexistence in relations with the imperialist 
states of the West
These strategic objectives of Soviet policy, although distinct from one 
another, are integrally interrelated The strengthening of the Soviet Union it­
self provides capabilities that enable the Soviet leadership more effectively to
pursue objectives farther afield, while the expansion of Soviet influence in the
h.
Third World can add to Soviet security and development
To what extent does the history of Soviet involvement in Africa coincide 
with these ojbectives? How does one explain the apparent qualitative shift in 
Soviet African policy in the latter half of the 1970s which was characterized by 
much greater involvement? Is it possible that, within the near future, Africa
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will rise on the scale of Soviet foreign policy priorities'7 These are a few 
of the question that we hope to answer in the present discussion In addition, 
we hope to demonstrate the factors that have enabled the Soviets to expand 
their involvement and the primary means that they have employed in their ef­
forts to expand that involvement
Although the Soviets initiated contacts with Africa soon after the decision 
to abandon Stalin s Eurocentric policy concentration in the mid-1950s an(^  ^be es­
tablishment of contacts with a number of developing countries in Asia, the pri­
mary expansion of Soviet involvemement in Africa came in I960— the major year of 
African decolonization Within a few years that were deeply involved in a number 
of African countries, although, as we have seen, by the endof the decade
most of their initial efforts at establishing Influence had failed The ever- 
 ^ throw of several progressive African leaders, the intrusion of the military 
into the political process in much of Africa, and the continuing economic de­
pendence of most African countries on the West led to a complete reassessment of
Soviet African policy by the end of the decade— in line with the much broader 
réévaluation of the foundations of Khurshchev s Third World policy
Throughout the 1960s Soviet involvement in Africa, even during the period 
of almost euphoric expectations about the rapid progress of Africa toward socialism, 
was extremely limited Trade, economic assistance, mill tary contacts, and other 
forms of interaction ranked extremely low when compared with Soviet relations 
with the countries of Asia and the Middle East ^ Yet, even this modest involve­
ment was scaled down after the defeats suffered by the USSR in the late 1960s
Only the training programs for Africans— both academic programs and the training 
of technicians and future cadres for Africa— continued to expand ^ Not only did 
the Soviets lack the capabilities to take advantage of the rapidly changing (^.
situation on the continent— e g , their Inability to provide effective support 
to friendly leaders when the latter were faced with strong domestic opposition—
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but Africa ranked low on the Soviet leaders list of foreign policy priorities 
Developments in Africa were of little relevance to the primary Soviet concern of 
defending and strengthening the empire, and the Soviets were not yet in a posi­
tion to challenge Western interests in the African region
The period since the beginning of the 197Cs has witnessed an important 
shift in Soviet policy in Africa— just as it has been a period of change in the 
global position of the USSR The change in policy was generally not foreseen by
Western analysts, many of whom had concluded that the Soviets had virtually writ-
7
ten off Sub-Shharan Africa as an area of major interest and involvement They 
were, therefore, ill-prepared in 1975 when the Soviets intervened dlrecly and 
massively in Angola— even at the risk of damage to their policy of detente with 
the Weit In retrospect it seems quite clear that Soviet policy in Angola was 
part of a reinvigorated Soviet effort to consolidate and to expand its global 
political and military role at the expense of both the United States (and its 
European allie'- and Communist China The more recent intervention of the Soviets 
and their Cuba -llies in the Horn of Africa is yet another indication of the 
much more active Soviet effort to extend its worldwide position of influence and
potential control
As others have already shown, Soviet involvement in Angola escalated sig-
Q
nificantly in the period after March 1975 By late 1975 an(i early 1976 the 
introduction into the civil war on the side of the MPLA of both large amounts of 
Soviet military equipment (including tanks, artillery and plane) ard more than 
12,000 Cuban troops played the decisive role in the MPLA s coming to power In­
termittent reports indicate that Soviet and Cuban support continue to be of cru­
cial importance to the MPLA in maintaining its position in the face of guerrilla 
operations In the Ogaden the active participation of Cuban troops resulted 
in Ethiopia's driving the Somali-supported forces out of the area and in Eritrea
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their assistance helped to undermine the position of the rebels However, the 
purpose of the following comments will not be to review the details of past So­
viet policy in Angola and Ethiopia Rather we shall attempt to evaluate pro­
bable Soviet motives and to place Soviet policy within the borader context of 
overall Soviet policy in the Third World
In some respects the crushing of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 represents a turning point in soviet foreign policy Since that time the 
Soviets have expanded their efforts at consolidation in Eastern Europe within 
both the Warsaw Treaty Qrginlzatlon and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
In addition, while the middle and late I96OS had witnessed something of a reduc­
tion in Soviet activities in portions of the Third World— in particular in Africa 
— there has been a significant revival of that activity during the past decade 
O  decade This does not mean that the Soviets have been extraordinarily success­
ful In fact, their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and Sadat s denunciation of 
the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Agreement four years later, as well as the more 
recent break between Somalia and the Soviet Union, are evidence of Soviet failures 
The point is, however, that during the 1970s the Soviets renewed the drive for 
influence throughout much of the Third World The goals of this drive are based 
primarily on a continuing Soviet effort to expand positions of influence and po­
wer in direct competition with the United States In 1975 Angola offered them 
the possibility of bringing to power a political party, the fiPLS, which would be 
dependent upon the Soviets for their very existence and would, presumably, be 
amenable to providing the Soviets with the facilities tb form a base of opera­
tions in southern Africa The value of such facilities for the Soviets— as for 
the United States in the past— has been evident During the Angolan war, for 
example, the Soviets were able to use the airport facilities jf Brazzaville as
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a staging area for supplies flowing to the MPIA, just as they later employed 
Aden as part of their supply line to Ethiopia Port facilities in Angola now 
provide the Soviets with an opportunity to operate in the south Atlantic that 
was unavailable to them in the past, jui as port facilities in the Eastern Medi­
terranean gave them an advantage during the 1973 Middle Eastern war that they did 
not possess six years earlier
Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and their continued
support of the MPIA government has been based on a variety of factors As legum
and Marchum both have demonstrated, Soviet rivalry with China for influence in
n
Africa was more important than competition with the United States 7 The MPIA 
victory in Angola effectively eliminated the immediate possibility of Chinese 
Influence in that country and also played an important part in the substantial 
reduction of Chinese involvement elsewhere in Africa But, given the begin­
nings of U S interest in supporting Neto’s opponents, demonstrated by the grant­
ing of $300,000 in aid to the FNIA, the Soviets were also concerned with pre­
venting the consolidation of American Influence in Angola
In addition to the direct competition with the Chinese and Americans in 
Angola, the location of Angola in relationship to white-dominated southern 
Africa presumably played a role in Soviet calculations The continuing and 
escalating conflicts in Zimbabwe (since resolved), Namibia, and South Africa 
provided the Soviets with opportunities to gain a presence in the region, 
should national liberation movements which they support come to power Friend­
ship with Angola and Mozambique and a Soviet presence in these countries facili­
tates Soviet support for the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa 
Although Angola and, for that matter, all of soùthern Africa are of minimal 
immediate strategic importance for the Soviet Union, regimes friendly to the
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Soviets ard the *1 /ailability of bases of operation in the region would provide 
important leverage vis-à-vis the l e s t in case of a future conflict situation 
Soviet vessels operating out of ports in southern Africa, coupled with a soviet 
naval presence in the western Indian Ocean operating out of Aden and the Horn 
of Africa would provide the USSR with the possibility of disrupting vital Middle 
Eastern oil supplies to Western Europe and the United States
after the overthrow of Emperor Haèle Selassie and the rapid radicalization 
of the revolutionary council which replaced him, the Soviets saw the opportunity 
for both undermining the U S position in the Horn of Africa and for expanding 
their own base of operations in northeastern Africa ^  Their expulsion from 
Egypt apparently played a role in this decision, for they had lost base-rights 
in Egypt However, they soon learned that their increasing support for the 
new Ethiopian rulers was strongly opposed by Somalia, in spite of the substantial 
support that they had supplied to the regime of President Siad Barre After 
unsuccessful attempts to mediate in the territorial conflict between Somalia and 
Ethiopia, the bovietsopted for the friendship of the larger and potentially more 
important Ethiopia By fall 1977 masáive Soviet and Cuban support began to flow 
into Ethiopia and during early 1978 this support played the major role in 
destroying the efforts of Somali tribesmen in the Ogaden— with the direct sup­
port of the Somali government— to break away from Ethiopian control Later So­
viet and Cuban support were transferred to Eritrea, where the Ethiopian govern­
ment faced a second major effort at secession
The Soviets ultimately decided that a unified and pro-Soviet Ethiopia in 
control of much of the northeastern portion of Africa was worth the risks in­
volved Yet the risks were substantial Not only did they result in the virtual 
breaking of relations with Somalia and the strong opposition of two former So-
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v ì p+ frlonrîB— Egypt aixl the budan— but they also led to a deterioration of Soviet 
relations with a number of Middle Eastern and African countries and exacerbated 
problems with the West
This cursory summary of several of the most important recent developments 
of Soviet policy in Africa must be compietmented with a discussion of the broader 
aspects of Soviet involvement on the continent However, before examining the 
Instruments employed by the Soviets in their attempts to expand their position 
in Africa, it is necessary to discuss the outlines of U S policy
3 U S Policy in Africa The Reaction to Soviet Initiatives
It is a bit more difficult to list the primary goals of the United States 
as they relate to Africa For most of the postwar period, as we have noted, 
Africa— especially those portions south of the Sahara— have been outside the 
primary focus of U S foreign policy Yet there has been a set of distinguish­
able U S interests in the affairs of the continent First, there was the goal 
of gaining access to military facilities of strategic importance to the United 
States Wheeler Air Force base in Libya and the multipurpose military facilities 
in Asmara, Ethiopia were primary examples of this aspect of U S policy These 
military facilities were important to the United States primarily for purposes 
of strengthening U S capabilities in the global competition with the Soviet 
Union In Ethiopia, for example, the relationship that was established between 
the U S and the government of Emperor Haile Selassie was based primarily, in 
the words of Marina Ottaway, on an exchange relationship, rather than an al­
liance 11 In return for guaranteed military facilities provided to the U S the 
Ethiopian government received substantial military assistance, including the 
creation and arming of a modern army
The second U S goal in Africa related to the fear of an expanding Soviet 
role in the affairs of the continent After the establishment of political, 
omonimie ami military contacts bètween the USSR (and some of its European allies) 
with individual Afilcan states in the early and mid-1960s, growing concern was 
voiced in the United States concerning the penetration of Africa by the Soviet 
Union At this time the issue was primarily one of the influence of the USSR in 
radicalizing existing governments, such as those of Ghana Guinea, Mall ard 
a bit later Sudan The U S reaction to developments in Africa tended to be 
based on the assumption that any gains— in presence or influence— by the Soviet 
Union in the development of its relations with Africa represented an automatic 
loss for Western interests
Increasingly the American concern for Soviet (or communist) expansion in 
Africa came into conflict with a third U S policy interest in Africa— namely, 
with the goal of facilitating the process of Independence for colonial territories 
In the immediate postwar period decolonization had been a major goal of the United 
States, and the U S government exerted various pressures on its allies to speed 
up the granting of Independence With the onset of the Cold War, however, and 
the increasing concerns for U S and Western military security decolonization 
dropped on the list of U S foreign policy priorities Continued access to im­
porta ntmilitary facilities in the Portuguese Canary Islands, for example, took pre­
cedence over support for the elimination of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa 
Although support for political independence for the remáining colonial territories 
remained a part of U S policy, that policy was pursued ohly sporadically and only 
when it did not threaten other U S Interests
The escalation of U S involvement in the Vietnamese War during the latter half 
of the 1960s had a number of important implications for U S Policy in Africa
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Host Important, probably, was the fact that the growing international and domes­
tic problems associated with the conduct of the war precluded the development of 
a cbherent U S African policy The United States continued to view Africa 
largely In terms of the Initiatives of its European allies Little effort was 
put into following— not to speak of influencing most developments on the African 
continent A second implication of the Vietnam War fer TJ S policy was to be 
seen most vividly only in the mid-1970s, when domestic revulsion to the debacle 
in Vietnam— coupled with the effects of the Watergate scandal and the revela­
tions of varioHS covert CIA activities abroad— created an atmosphere in which it 
became virtually impossible for the U S government to initiate any type of 
major involvement— especially of a military sort in Africa
Although the Soviets ha d become deeply involved in Somalia during the 
(  ' 1960s— and especially after the I969 coup that brought the military government
of Siad Barre to power— it was not until the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola 
in late 1975 that American concerns about the military role of the Soviets in 
Africa began to exert an influence on U S policy During the Angolan War Sec­
retary of State Kissinger and President Ford sought Congressional support for the 
expansion of the limited U S military assistance to the two nationalist factions 
fighting the Soviet-backed MPIA However, the domestic reactions to the recent 
events of defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate affair resulted in effective op­
position to any U S military irvolvement in Angola Moreover, the direct in­
tervention of Soùth African troops into the war in support of UNITA and FNLA 
brought about a rapid shift within Africa in support of the MPIA faction of 
President— and, by implication, of Soviet and Cuban assistance to the MPIA The 
end result was an eventual MPIA victory and the consolidation of power through­
out most of the country— a vicotry that would have been impossible without Cuban-
Soviet support
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The Carter administrâtion,prodded by U S ambassador to the United Na 
tions Andrew Young, began a gradual reconsideration of U S policy in Africa 
For the first time since the 19^0s it appeared that concerns of the African 
states themselfes— as opposed to the importance of Africa for superpower com­
petition— were to determine U S policies Greater emphasis began to be placed 
on dealing with problems endemic to the African states themselves and the con­
cerns of bilateral U S -African relations The Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa 
was not viewed exclusively and necessarily inimical to all U S interests, and 
the U b attempted to improve relations with a number of self-proclaimed Marxist- 
Leninist states— in particular with Mozambique However, the rapid deterioration 
of the situation in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78— especially the Somali inter­
vention in the Ogaden in support of the irredentist West Somali Liberation 
Frong and the Soviet-Cuban decision to intervene on the side of Addis Ababa 
with massive military support— rekindled U b fears of Soviet gains in the con­
tinent ax the expense of Uestem interests
Although National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated a policy 
of countering Soviet expansionist designs in Africa, the U S response to 
the Soviet Intervention in the Horn was quite limited The nature of the con­
flict itself— an obvious invasion of Ethiopia by Somalia— and the orientation of 
the oomali government made it difficult for the U S  to do much more thanwarn the 
Soviets and Eubans against an Invasion of Somali territory In response to Slad 
Barre s calls for Western military support, the United States responded pm,u 
with the promise to assist Somalia should Soviet and Cuban-backed Ethiopian troops 
move across the border into Somalia proper It was not until after the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan in the last days of 1979 that the U S seriously consi­
dered the Somali offer of use of the military facilities abandoned by the Soviets 
with they were expelled in 1977 in return for U S military assistance
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Slnce the Soîiet invasion of Afghanistan there has evolved a growing con­
cern in Washington about the expansion of Soviet military involvement in Africa 
However, this has not yet resulted in a U S effort to match the Soviets in the 
use of military power on the continent Rather, the U S response has tended to 
follow to separate, but interrelated, lines On the one hand— primarily in the 
northeastern portion of the continent most important from a strategic perspec­
tive to U S interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region— the U S 
has attempted to strengthen its military position vis-à-vis the Soviets by ne­
gotiating agreements with Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, and, further afield, Oman, 
for access to military facilities In return, the U S has promised security 
support to the host states— security support which has been very slow to arrive 
in some cases Elsewhere on the continant the United States has continued a po­
licy initiated in the 1970s of attempting to play a more active role in facili­
tating negotiated settlements of major regional conflicts
This policy actually began in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when 
Secretary of State Henry Kissingerintroduced shuttle diplomacy as a means of 
bringing about the cease fire For the better part of a decade the U S has do­
minated the attempt to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli con­
frontation by acting as mediator and facilitator of the process of negotiations 
In Sub-Saharan Africa the first major U S involvement as a mediator oc­
curred during the Lancaster House negotiatioss which resulted in the resolution 
of the war in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and the establishment of the independent state 
of Zimbabwe Even though the U S role at Lancaster House was secondary to that 
of the British, it was important in working out the final agreements Here, as 
in the earlier discussions between Egypt and Israel, American policy was based 
on several assumptions First, it had become clear that in tnose cases in which 
the USSR had succeeded in gaining a major presence, in particular a military pre-
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r  sence, they had teen able to take advantage of local or regional conflicts
The peaceful resolution of such conflicts would eliminate the perceived need of 
the participants to turn to the Soviets and Cubans fof military support and the 
likelihood that Soviet military support could be turned to a Soviet advantage 
hare recently, in the case of the war in Namibia, the United States has 
continued to pursue a policy of encouraging negotiated settlement of African 
conflicts, although the prospects for such a settlement still seem exceedingly
weak
U S African policy under the Reagan Administration has shifted somewhat 
from the policy of the Carter years uost important has been the revival-at 
least in official rhetoric-of the primacy of the Sovlet-American confrontation 
U 3 African policy once agains appears to be dominated by the concern with 
Soviet expansionist designs on Africa and the growing military role of the 5o- 
' vlets aid their allies throughout the continent Public considerations of re­
suming military support to UNITA in Angola, of providing South africa with 
limited access to U S military equipment, and the expanded commitment of mili­
tary support to countries in the northeast quadrant of the continent are all 
examples of this new orientation One partial resilt has been a deterioration 
of u S rèations with a number of black African states which view the p.licies 
of the Reagan Administration as inimical to the interests .f the black popula- 
tl«ns of Namibia and South Africa
To a certain degree U S policy under President Reagan has returned— after 
only a relatively brief respite under President Carter— to an emphasis on super­
power confrontation as the major motivating factor in U 3 African policy
l
4 Military Assistance and Arms Transfers In Soviet and American Policy
Military assistance and arms transfers have been an integral part of both 
Soviet and U S policy toward developing countries ever since the beginnings of 
Sovlet-American competition in the Third World ^  The U S policy of alliance 
building under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the mid-1950s, as well 
as the establishment of Soviet relations with a number of Middle Eastern states 
at approximately the same time, incorporated security support and arms transfers 
as an essential element of the expansion of bilateral relations During the 
past decade the military aspects of Soviet policy toward the developing world—  
and toward Africa in particular— have outstripped most other forms of contact 
Military support, including the transfer of weapons systems and the provision 
of military training, have become the single most important element in Soviet 
relations with a number of countries of Africa During the period 1972-79 Soviet 
military deliveries to Third World countries averaged $3»553 million per year, 
compared with deliveries of economic assistance averaging only $515 million 
(see Table l) The major recipients of the increased Soviet deliveries during 
the latter half of the past decade were Libya and Algeria, which pay for weapons 
with hard currency, Iraq, Ethiopia, and Angola Not only have Soviet sales and 
deliveries Increased substantially during the past ten years, but the regional 
distribution of deliverèes has also been extended Until 1973 approximately 86 
percent of all Soviet arms commitments and deliveries went to a few countries in 
South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa With the expansion of Soviet 
involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s that area has also become a 
major recipient of Soviet military equipment,and the USSR has replaced France as 
the primary arms supplier for Africa Between 1975 and 1979 new commitments of 
military support to Sub-Saharan Africa and actual deliveries made up about l b
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percent of both new commitments and deliveries to developing countries In ad­
dition, North Africa received 22 and 30 percent respectively of new commitments 
ard deliveries Comparable figures for the period 1956-74 are 3 8 percent of 
new commitments and three percent of deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa and 14 8 
and 4 9 percent of new commitments and deliveries to North Africa ^  (See Tables
2 4 3)
Although arms transfers and military assistance have been an important ele­
ment in U S relations with the Third World during the past quarter century, 
their place in U S policy in Africa has been quite limited Prior to the mid- 
1970s only Ethiopia, among the Sub-Saharan African states, was an important re­
cipient of U S military supplies As has been noted, the U S relationship 
with Ethiopia was based on an exchange of U S military support to Ethiopia in 
return for access to military facilities in Asmara During the period 1974-78 
the U S supplied less than 4 0 percent of armaments shipped to Africa (minus 
Egypt), while the Soviets provided more than 55 0 percent During that period 
only one African country, Kenya, obtained as much as half of its armaments from 
the U S , while 18 African countries received more than half of their weapons 
from the USSR (See Table 3)
The arms export program of the USSR has differed in composition from that 
of the United States Most important has been the greater role of military ser­
vices in the American program Until quite recently U S deliveries of such ser­
vices have been nearly four times as great as those of the USSR as the result of 
a much larger provision of training and technical assistance and of a military 
construction program unparalleled by the Soviet Union On the other hand, Soviet 
^ deliveries of weapons systms to all developing countries have been slightly larger 
than those of the U S and have made up a greater portion of the total Soviet 
arms exports than is the case in the U S program Since the mid-1970s, how-
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ever, Soviet military-related services have grown markedly Moreover, this 
growth was complemented by the services provided by Soviet allies— Cuba and 
Eàst Germany in particular ^  An additional difference between the Soviet and 
U S programs concerns the time elapsed between sale anddelivery Soviet wea­
pons are usually delivered to Third World customers much more rapidly than are 
those of the United States— within 12-18 months, on average, compared with U S 
lead times of up to three years ^  In recent months, Somalia and Egypt have both 
complained about the failure of the U S  to deliver weapons promised almost two 
years ago
No matter how one measures the Soviet military support program in the Third 
World, and particularly in Africa, the eiidenibe indicates its growing importance 
in Soviet policy during the 1970s Before proceeding with our examination of the
(!> reasons for the expansion of Soviet military support in the Third World, it is 
important to understand a number of factors inherent in the Soviet economic-poli­
tical system which affect the ability of the Soviets to engage in the type of 
military support operations that they have developed First, the Soviet Union
17has become the largest producer of conventional military equipment in the world
Exports have become the most effective means of disposing of this huge surplus
of weapons and, as we shall see below, have become an importait supplementary
18
method of earning hard currency Moreover, given the focus of the Sòvièt economy 
on military production, this sector has become the most efficient and competitive 
of all sectors of the Sòvièt economy Soviet military equipment is usually quali­
tatively equal to, or even superior to, comparable equipment obtainable from other 
suppliers The Soviets have, therefor^, large stockpiles of surplus weapons of 
good quality and recent vintage that they can make available to Third World 
states The growing availability of such weapons has coincided with the pheno-
menai expansion of the market foi* weapons throughout Asia, Africa, and latin 
19America
Another factor relevant tro Soviet arms transfer policy has been the growth 
of the Soviet navy and its operation in waters far from Soviet territory By 
the beginning of the 1970s this fleet was operational and required access to 
facilities throughout Asia and Africa Arms transfers to certain Third World 
states have provided the exchange in Soviet attempts to acquire access to such 
facilities
The primary purposes of Soviet arms assistance and sales, however, have 
remained political Yet, over time, the very nature of the political aspects 
of Soviet policy in the Third World has evolved Initially, the primary concern 
of the Soviet Union in extending military assistance to developing countries was 
the desire to undermine Western influence and strategic interests in regions }f 
strategic concern for Soviet security— especially the Middle East and South Asia 
The 1955 agreement to supply weapons to Egypt valued at more than $250 million, 
as well as later agreements with Yemen, Syria and Iraq20 were all designed to 
undermine the attempts t>f the United States to ring the Soviet Union with an
system The Soviets were able to take advantage of the growing antago­
nisms between revolutionary nationalist Arabs and the West, plus the festering 
hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in order to gain a presence in 
the Middle East The provision of weapons, althcugh by no means the sole method 
employed by the USSR, was the most effective method available to them to make an 
impact on political developments in the region
Closely related to the Soviet goal of weakening Western dominance in Third 
World areas was the desire to establish and extend the presence of the Soviet 
Union itself In almost all cases where Soviet military equipment was supplied 
to developing countries, Soviet military technicians arrived along with the equip-
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ment, in order to instruct the local military in its use A corollary to this 
policywas the training of officers from developing countries in the Soviet 
Union In Africa the major cases of such Soviet Involvement have been Egypt 
at the beginning of the 1970s, Somalia until 1977, and Angola and Ethiopia 
where the Soviets and their allies have played a major role in training and 
even commanding the local military However, a number of other Affican states 
have become increasingly dependent on the Soviets and their allies for mili­
tary support
As noted above, technical training has also been an essential element of 
U S military assistance in the Third 'iorld However, given the very limited 
nature of the U S military involvement in Africa, only a very few countries 
have benefitted frnn such training Only in recent years has Egypt become 
an important recipient of U S military assistance, including training Earlier 
Ethiopia, Morocco, and a few other countries were involved m  U S military 
training programs
In addition to the goal of gaining political access through military support, 
another purpose of Soviet policy has been the effort to provide stability f«r 
countries that have turned to the USSR for assistance This has become an es­
pecially important element of Soviet policy in Africa since the mid-1970s, where 
the Soviets and their East European and Cuban allies have provided not only mili­
tary equipment ard technical assistance, but even the military personnel needed 
by revolutionary movements or regimes, as in Angola and Ethiopia, to seize power 
or to consolidate that power Throughout Africa the East Germans, in consort with 
their Soviet mentors, have been providing military and security training for a 
number of revolutionary governments— e g bomalis (before 1977), Angola, Mozam- 
bique, and Ethiopia, among others This emphasis on the training of elite
í
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palace guards and domestic security police has resulted from the experi­
ences in the 1960s of progressive regimes favorably lnclinéd toward the Soviet 
Union, when leaders such as Nkrumah in Ghana were easily overthrown The pre­
sence of well-trained and loyal security forces is now viewed by the Soviets as 
essential to stabilize the existence of progressive Marxist-Leninist govern­
ments in a number of African countries
Before we examine examine the military-strategic and economic motives of 
Soviet military policies in Africa, mention should be made of another relevant 
political factor The Soviets have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the in­
ternational environment has undergone substantial change in recent years, that 
the role of the capitalist West is receding and that a new international corre­
lation of forces has emerged However, only by actively engaging in events on 
a global scale can the Soviets demonstrate to leaders throughout the world that 
their assessment of the changing international balance is indeed accurate If 
nothing else, the Soviès have shown in recent years that they have both the 
ability and the willingness to provide effective military support to their al­
lies The success of the MPLA in Angola or of the revolutionary leadership in 
Ethiopia is attributable primarily to Soviet (and Cuban) military support The 
provision of varioss forms of military assistance in Asia and Africa has been 
among the most important means employed by the Soviets to verify their claim 
that a changing intematlooal balance of forces has already emerged The image 
of the USSR as equal— or even superior— to the United States may well influence 
Third World leaders to work out a modus vivendi wihh the Soviets, or with their 
clients, given the possibly dominant future rile of the Soviet Union in the 
international system
Integrally connected with the Soviet desire to strengthen its global role 
is the continuing competition with the United States and China Over the course
{
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of the past 15 years, or so, Soviet policy in the Third World has been based, 
in large part, on the desire to expand the capability of projecting power abroad 
in support of Soviet state interests These projection capabilities depend upon 
two separate but interrelated developments First, there was the need to produce 
the military equipment necessary to exert military power in regions beyond the 
territory under the immediate control of the Soviet army The second require­
ment was access to military facilities throughout the Third World at which to 
refuel, repair, and refurbish the newly-developed military capabilities The 
transfer of military equipment, along with economic assistance and other forms
of support, has been employed as part of an overall policyof competition with
22the West for the acquisition and maintenance of such strategic access Since 
the late 1960s the Soviets have been especially successful in creating anetwork 
of such facilities throughout the Indian Ocean area, the Middle East, and various 
parts of Africa that now permits them to influence developments in areas far 
from Soviet territory
Regional conflicts, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict, were of im­
portance in providing the Sovifts with initial access to military facilities in 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq In Africa, the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia 
has afforded the USSR with a dual opportunity— first, the acquisition of large- 
scale military facilities in Somalia, and later, after their decision to opt 
for support for the new revolutionary regime in Addis Ababa and the resulting 
loss of the Somali facilities, the acquisition of new (though inferior) in­
stallations in Ethiopia The civil war in Angola and the war between Somalia 
and Ethiopia in the Horn have indicated both the extent of existing Soviet mili­
tary facilities and their importance to the USSR in supporting its allies and 
clients Without access to air facilities in Algeria, Benin, Congo, Guinea, and 
elsewhere in West Africa, the rapid and large-scale shipment of Soviet military
23equipment and Cuban troops to Angola would have been impossible
A final point must also be made concerning the impermanence of the Soviet 
military position in some of the countries in which they have acquired military 
facilities Both Egypt and Somalia expelled the Soviets when their goals and 
those of the Soviet Union clashed and recent events in the Middle East have re­
sulted in a reduction of Soviet access in Syria, at the time of the Lebanese 
civil wax, and Irqq after the introduction of Sòvièt equipment into Ethiopia 
The Soviets have apparently been aware of the tenuous nature of their military 
presence in the developing world and have generally followed a policy of estab­
lishing parallel, or backup, facilities For example, throughout the late 1960s 
and early 1970s they simultaneously courted North Yemen, South Yemen, Somalia and 
Egypt When Somalia expelled the Soviets as a result of the latter s military 
support for Ethiopia, the Sovièts were still able to use the facilities in South
Yemen In West Africa, as well, the Soviets have developed a parallel set of
2llr
facilities in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Mali
The United States has also found that its access to military facilities in 
Africa— and elsewhere in the Third World— is also dependent upon the vagaries 
of local developments Coups d'Etat, as in Libya and Ethiopia, have resulted in 
the loss of military facilities that had been developed over the period of a 
decade, or more In addition, changing political-military circumstances have 
resulted in invitations to enter regions— as in Somalia, Sudan and Egypt during 
the recent past The major point to consider is the fact that military access 
has been granted to the two superpowers only when the host states have seen such 
a presence as important for its own security interests
One final point should be made about the development of the Soviet arms 
transfer program In addition to the political and military-security aspects of 
the program, there is also the growing importance of the hard-currancy earnings
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<r— — that the Soviets derive from arms sales ^  For the period 1973-78 an es­
timated 43 percent of all military deliveries were paid for in hard currency—  
$7,390 million of a total of $17,200 million This represents approximately one- 
third of the total hard currency deficit in merchandise trade experienced by 
the USSR during those years Ever since the rise in OPEC oil prices and the re­
sulting availability cf large amounts of hard currency in a number of oil-producing 
countries, the Soviets have been receiving hard currency for most of the weapons 
supplied to the Middle East In Africa, however, only Libya, which has become 
a major recipient of Soviet weapons, pays for its purchases with hard currency 
The available evidence shows thit arms exports to Third World states have 
become an important sources of hard currency and that they now play a major role 
in covering the deficits in Soviet trade with the industrial West Although the 
economic factor is not among the most important influences determining Soviet 
arms transfers— and in Africa it plays a very small role— it is likely that it 
increasingly comes into consideration as the Soviet leadership makes its deci­
sions concerning the value of providing arms to various Third World customers 
Although there has been an increase in U S arms supplies to individual 
African states in recent years, the increase has been quite modest in comparison 
with the growth of Soviet deliveries In the case of U S security assistance 
to Africa the primary motivations have been the desire to gain access to re­
gional military facilities— as in Kenya arti. Somalia— and the goal of supporting 
countries which see themselves threatened by Soviet-backed states or movements*
5 The Zero-Sum Nature of Soviet and American Policies in Africa
To a very substantial degree Soviet and American policies in Africa in 
reenet years— and, in fact, throughout most of the postwar period— have been
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racterlzed largely by concern for the activities of the other superpower 
policy has been motivated primarily by a desire to gain advantages in 
the global competition with the United states, while American policy— though less 
clearly single-minded than thit of the UobR-has usually consisted of a reaction 
to soviet initiatives In spite of much evidence to the contrary, both of the 
two global superpowers appear to have operated on the assumption that a gain 
for one represented an automatic loss for the otner There has been little evi­
dence of any form of cooperation in dealing with matters of mutual interest.
One reason for this, perhaps, is the relative unimportance of Africa-at least 
those portions south of the Sahara— for the Ussfi in any other than a military- 
security sense Although Soviet trade with African has expanded during the 
past thirty years, it remains an insignificant 1 7 percent of total Soviet trade 
(see Table 1*) Even those African states which have established close politi­
cal and military ties with the USSR (such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) 
continue to conduct most of their commercial relations with the West For the 
United States, on the other hand, trade with Africa has been of growing impor-
tance especially imports of petroleum and other strategic raw materials (see 
Table 5) 26
Even though Africa has not ranked high on the list of recipients of U S 
economic assistance, U S aid tes been substantially larger than that of the 
Sòvièt Union Through 1979 total Soviet economic assistance committed to the 
countries of Africa since the inception of the aid program in the 1950s amounted 
to $h,bl5 million ($5,555 million Including Egypt), while that of the U S 
came to $7,1*91 ($12.571 million, including Egypt) (See Table 6) During the 
period 1975-79 new commitments of Soviet aid to Africa, excluding $2,000 million 
to Morocco for the expansion of phosphates production, totalled $572 million
During the same period U S aid amounted to $6,1*77 million ($2,31*5 million ex- 
eluding aid to Egypt)
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In spite of the expansion of Soviet and U S Involvement In the affairs of 
Africa during the past decade, Africa still remains an area of secondary impor­
tance for the policies of the two countries Its major importance— in particu­
lar for the Soviets— has been to provide strategic access that is viewed as be­
neficial for the global military-political competiton with the United States
Soviet goals in Africa have included l) the reduction of Western military 
and political influence, 2) the containment of posilble Chinese influence, 3) 
the establishment of a network of military facilities that will enable Soviet 
military forces to project power in a region far from the Soviet homeland, and 
4) at a much lower level of importance, the possible economic benefits that can 
be gained for the Soviet economy Soviet military assistance and arms transfer 
programs— the most important element of Soviet policy in Africa— have been moti­
vated by political and strategic concerns and have been related to Soviet support 
for ideologically compatible allies, the search for strategic benefits, and the 
building of the foundations for future political influence
For the United States the goals, although similar, have tended to le a bit 
broader than those of their Soviet competitors l) containment of Soviet mili­
tary and polical influence in Africa, 2) the acquisition of access to military 
facilities useful in the military competition with the Soviet Union, and 3) much 
more important than in the Soviet case, the securing of U S economic interests 
in the region
One of the results of this growing superpower competition in Africa has been 
the tendency in recent years for African states to be forced to take sides in the 
gihobal superpower conflict Moreover, the introduction of more sophisticated 
weapons into regional conflicts in Africa has led to the escalation of the level 
of military conflict and has, in many cases, resulted in an increasing percentage 
of national income being committed to military security— while developmental needs
(
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have been given lower priority The increase in military expenditures in both 
Zaire and Zambia in recent years at the time that economic problems have plagued 
both countries is an example of this point
To date neither the U S nor the USSR has been able to make stable gains 
in their relationships with the African states Yet both countries continue to 
view the African continent as an area of competition Sòvièt gains are viewed 
as threats to U S inèerests by both the Soviet and U S leaderships So far 
neither of the two superpowers has emerged a winner, although it is possible 
to argue that the Africans have often been the losers, in the sense that super­
power involvement has not been beneficial to the long-term interests of the local 
population Whether the recent Soviet approach to certain African states, which 
has emphasized the establishment of domestic political systems based on the So­
viet model, will prove to be more successful in stabilizing the Soviet position 
is a question that should be answered during the 1980s
\ L
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Table 1
SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY REIATIONS WITH 
NON-COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1955-1979 
(in millions of current U S dollars)
Deliveries________________ New Agreements
USSR USA USSR
Total, 1955-79 35,360 66,876 47,3^0
1979 6,615 6,679 8,365
1978 5.600 7,976 2,^65
1977 6,705 7,130 8,715
1976 3,085 5,928 5,550
1975 2,060 3,325 3,325
1974 2,225 6,430 5,735
1973 3.135 5.735 2,890
1972 1,215 3,975 1,690
1971 865 1,590
1970 995 1,150
1955-69 5.875 5,080
SOURCES For Soviet data, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign
Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less 
Developed Countries, 1979 and 195*^-79 A Research Paper October 
1980, ER 8O-IO3I8U, p 13 For data on the United States, Central 
Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Handbook 
of Economic Statistics 1980, October 1980, pp 10^106
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Table 2
DELIVERIES CF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMAMENTS TO AFRICA, 1907-76 
(in millions of current U S Dollars)
Arms Imports Amrs Imports Total Arms Soviet U S
from USSR, from USA, Imports of Percentage Percentage
1967-76 1967-76 Country, of Total, of Total,
1967-76 1967-76 1967-76
TOTAL. All Develop- 
ing Countries
TOTAL. Africa
10.753
2,051 404
3^.631
5,131*
31 1 
40 0 7 9
Algeria 3I5 5 445 70 8 1 1
Angola I9O - 315 60 3 —
Benin 1 - 10 10 0 —
Burundi - - - - -
Cameroun - 5 15 - 33 3
Cape Verde - - - - —
Cent African Rep 1 - 5 20 0 —
Chad 5 - 10 5 0 0 —
Congo 10 - 20 50 0 —
Equat Guinea 5 - 5 100 0 —
Ethiopia - 135 190 - 71 1
Guinea 50 - 55 90 1 —
Guinea-Bissau 5 - 5 100 0 —
Ivory Coast - 1 30 - 3 3
Kenya - 5 51 - 9 8
Liberia - 5 5 - 100 0
Libya 1,005 65 1,835 54 8 3 5
Madagascar 1 - 5 20 0 —
Mali 25 - 25 100 0 —
Morocco 10 55 350 2 9 15 7
Mozambique 15 - 20 75 0 —
Nigeria 70 31 221 31 7 14 0
Somalia 181 - 185 97 8 -
South Africa - 30 500 - 6 0
Sudan 65 1 100 65 0 1 0
Tanzania 30 1 125 24 0 0 8
Tunisia 40 6 5 - 61 5
Uganda 65 - -81 80 2 -
Zaire - 30 240 - 12 5
Zambia 10 - 81 12 3 -
*Includes all countries of the region
SOURCES U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers 1967-1976 Washington U S , ACDA, 1978, pp 
157-160
-36- 
Table 3
DELIVERIES CF SÒVIÈT AND AMERICAN ARMENTS TO AFRICA, 197*+-78 
(in millions of current U S Dollars)
Arms Imports Arms Imports Total Arms Soviet U S
from USSR, from USA, Imports of Percentage Percentage
197/4^ 78 197/+-78 Country, of Total, of Total,
197^78 197*+-78 197*+-78
TOTAL. All Develop- 17,550 50,750 3*+ 6
ins Countries
TOTAL. Africa 7, *+00 *+80 13,100* 56 5 3 7
Algeria 1,200 - 1,500 80 0
Angola *+10 - 725 56 6
Benin 20 - 30 66 7
Burundi 5 - 10 50 0 —
Cameroun - 10 30 - 33 3
Cape Verde 20 - 20 100 0 —
Cent African Rep - - - — —
Chad 10 - 10 100 0 —
Congo 30 - *+0 75 0 —
Equqt Guinea 10 - 10 100 0 —
Ethiopia 1,300 100 1,600 81 3 6 3
Guinea 50 - 50 100 0 —
Guinea-Bissau 10 - 10 100 0 —
Ivory Coast - - 10 -
Kenya - 50 100 — 50>0
Liberia - - — — —
Libya 3, *+00 - 5.000 68 0 —
Madagascar 20 5 30 66 7 16 7
Mali 100 - no 90 0 —
Morocco 20 170 95s 2 1 17 9
Mozambique 130 - 180 72 2 —
Nigeria 80 30 200 *+0 0 15 0
Somalia 300 - 500 60 0 —
South Africa - 20 6OO - 3 3
Sudan 30 30 no 27 3 27 3
Tanzania no - 180 61 1 -
Tunisia - 20 80 - 25 0
Uganda no - 120 91 7 -
Zaire - 20 260 - 7 7
Zambia *+o - l*+0 28 6 -
Includes all countries
SOURCES: U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers 1969-1978 Washington: U S , ACDA, 1980, pp
530-102
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Table 6
U S AND SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 
EXTENDED TO AFRICA, 1946-1979
(in Millions of current U S dollars)
U S A  USSR
-»11 African 
Countries1
Egypt alone All African 
Countries1
Egypt alone'
1946-793 12,571 5,080 5,555 1,440
1979 1,486 885 >95 0
1978 1,5**6 943 2,010 0
1977 1,325 9O8 31 0
1976 1,415 1,017 369 0
1975 705 370 67 0
1974 321 21 17 0
1973 258 1 10 0
1972 301 2 0 0
Includes loans and grants to all African states, including Egypt 
^The last commitment of Soviet aid to Etypt was made in 1971 
-'Soviet assistance began in the mid-1950sJ the figures cover the period 
1954-79
SOURCES: For U S data, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign
Assessment Center, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1981 November 
1980, pp 102-103 For Soviet data, annual issues of the Central 
Intelligence Agency s assessments of communist countries aid to 
the Third World, for which the title varies The most recent is­
sue is Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed 
Countries. 1979 and 1954-79: A Research Pa-per. October 1980,
ER 8O-IO3I8U
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